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Is school choice nefarious, for students of color and for everyone else? 
Or is it helpful? Debates over this question, now decades old, are feeling a 
bit stale. Diane Ravitch’s just-published Reign of Error breaks no new ground 
when it accuses those of us who sympathize with school choice of embracing 
“a radical ideology with a fundamental distrust of public education and 
hostility to the public sector in general.”1 And Justice Clarence Thomas, 
were he to read Ravitch, likely would feel no need to update his 2002 
denunciation of “cognoscenti who oppose vouchers,” who elevate their 
“romanticized ideal of universal public education” above the real needs of 
“urban families [who] just want the best education for their children.”2 
One reason for stalemate is that the debate’s participants often avoid 
declaring, and often purposely obfuscate, whether they disagree about 
principle or about tactics. Advocates on both sides love to talk about whether 
schools of choice are effective, as if people generally agree about what 
constitutes an effective school. They are also fond of accusing their 
interlocutors of harboring and hiding distasteful ideological commitments.3 
 
         Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor 
Osamudia James for her article and for her comments on an earlier version of this Response. I 
also appreciate the useful comments of R.A. Lenhardt and Kimani Paul-Emile. 
 1. DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION MOVEMENT AND 
THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 19 (2013). 
 2. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 682 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 3. See JEFFREY R. HENIG, SPIN CYCLE 34 (2008) (“[K]ey interest groups have been 
unwilling or unable to find common ground; any movement toward a position of compromise 
is resisted as symbolic defeat, a first step down a slippery path toward either a Leviathan 
government or a Wild West scenario in which corporations run amok and the only consumers 
who count are those with cash in their pockets.”). For examples, see Zelman, 536 U.S. at 682 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that opponents of school vouchers that can be redeemed at 
religious schools “raise formalistic concerns about the Establishment Clause but ignore the core 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2412205 
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Disappointingly few acknowledge their positions’ deep roots in their own 
conceptions of justice—conceptions that are far from commanding 
universal assent. 
In this respect, the explicit normativity of Professor Osamudia James’s 
Opt-Out Education is refreshing. Equality, James tells us, ought to trump 
liberty when it comes to schools. Indeed, “the ideal[] [of] . . . individual 
liberty . . . [is] arguably completely inappropriate in a public school 
setting.”4 “If our goal is equality, then choice must be minimized.”5 To put it 
this way is to acknowledge that many disagreements about school choice 
stem from foundational disagreement about the aspirations of this society 
and its goals for children. The choice debate, in many respects, instantiates 
the republic’s longstanding contest between equality and liberty. 
Reconciling the tension between these values is of course a perennially 
difficult undertaking, but it is helpful to identify it as the task at hand. 
At the same time, the school choice debate is not exclusively about 
conflicts between high principles. Another argument favored by opponents 
of school choice is that for many people it is not “choice” at all because it is 
deeply constrained by “social, racial, and economic isolation.”6 According to 
this view, choice opposes not only equality but also freedom; it enhances 
liberty only for those who already enjoy racial and economic privilege. There 
are two problems with this claim. First, constrained choice—even when 
constraints are very substantial—is still choice. Second, traditional public 
schooling is deeply shaped by the same social, racial, and economic isolation 
that limits choice. As Professor James admits, the condition of many public 
schools that serve racially segregated, poor neighborhoods accounts for 
much of the demand for alternatives in those communities.7 To the choice 
advocate, meeting such demand, and a fortiori subsidizing it with public 
funds, clearly improves welfare, even in an environment of constraint. 
A third variety of argument condemns choice as a matter of political 
strategy. The signal contribution of Professor James’s Article is to argue that 
choice, by displacing responsibility for bad outcomes from the public sector 
to the choosing parents, undermines public enthusiasm for tackling the 
deep injustices that marginalize students of color and the poor and 
 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment” that school choice would serve); JOHN E. CHUBB & 
TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 12 (1990) (noting that opponents 
of choice seek to preserve “their jobs, revenues, and economic security”); RAVITCH, supra note 
1, at 22–26 (although “some” pro-choice reformers “sincerely believe” in its merits, many are 
“partisan,” “powerful and wealthy,” “deeply reactionary,” and motivated by money and personal 
ambition). 
 4. Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. 
REV. 1083, 1098 (2014). 
 5. Id. at 1129. 
 6. Id. at 1121. 
 7. Id. at 1085–86. 
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complicates efforts to build political coalitions to tackle those problems. 
Exit, to use the classic categories, mutes voice. 
The claim that the atomistic, individualistic neoliberalism of choice 
dampens the capacity of the polity to confront structural problems of 
racism, poverty, housing, food insecurity, and healthcare is intriguing both 
as a critical and an empirical observation. It is not, however, a strong policy 
objection to school choice. In a society already dominated by individualism 
and market values, and enduringly infected by racism, the new political 
coalitions that Professor James imagines are unlikely successfully to 
overcome intractable problems of social inequality. A better strategy, I think, 
is to capitalize upon the interest convergence between marginalized and 
privileged groups that school choice offers. Removing some number of 
poor, minority students from failing public schools and educating them 
instead in charters or in other kinds of schools that they and their families 
prefer will perhaps create better-educated citizens who can effectively 
participate in, and even lead, socially progressive coalitions. This outcome is 
far from guaranteed. But it seems more plausible than the hope that by 
foreclosing exit from bad public schools, we will galvanize the polity to fix 
public schools, whose distress it has over many decades proved itself more 
than willing to tolerate. 
I. WHAT IS “PUBLIC” SCHOOL? 
There is great appeal to prioritizing equality when it comes to educating 
children. Pick your adjective: American educational inequality is a 
dispiriting, festering, appalling morass, made even more ignominious by the 
often fulsome commitment of American political culture to equality of 
educational opportunity in the abstract. When it comes to schooling, the 
prosperous and entitled rich routinely exercise privilege and power to the 
detriment of the vulnerable and the subordinated. School choice, however, 
cannot properly be characterized solely or even primarily as such an 
exercise. 
Education undertakes to inculcate patterns of thought, moral behavior, 
and citizenship in the young. We have long understood that such an 
enterprise demands “basic value choices on which school policy and practice 
are based.”8 Such choices are simultaneously central to the democratic 
project and deeply controversial. Unlike Milliken v. Bradley, Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters is not a Potemkin case that gins up tendentious arguments in a 
transparent effort to protect the powerful at the expense of everyone else. 
Pierce’s objections that children are not “mere creature[s] of the State” were 
and remain genuine.9 Likewise its claim that parents’ prerogative to direct 
 
 8. Stephen Arons, The Separation of School and State: Pierce Reconsidered, 46 HARV. EDUC. 
REV. 76, 78 (1976). 
 9. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
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their children’s education is “fundamental” to liberty.10 Oregon parents did 
not seek religious instruction from the Society of Sisters because they felt 
“that it’s not enough for their kids to win: others must lose.”11 They were 
dissenters and the targets of bigotry.12 At the time of Pierce, it was the Ku 
Klux Klan whose platform called for mandatory public schooling,13 and 
democrats like John Dewey who argued that the availability of alternative 
options reflected “American toleration and trust and good faith between 
various elements of the population and in each other.”14 
By no means does the KKK’s endorsement of public school monopoly a 
century ago contaminate by association the views of those who urge 
compulsory public education under contemporary circumstances.15 But 
private schooling was, in the 1920s, a genuine protection of liberty for the 
persecuted and the marginalized. We have relatively powerless dissenters 
today too—dissenters as to religion, to be sure, but also as to methods of 
discipline, as to pedagogy, and, yes, even as to curriculum in fraught areas 
like history and science.16 Their liberty interests are neither trivial nor 
pretextual.17 
For the same reasons, I am reluctant to treat the choices of relatively 
powerless persons necessarily as “false choices.”18 Minority communities like 
majority ones, poor ones like rich ones, include dissenters who object to 
various orthodoxies and to public monopolies that perpetuate them. And 
they include persons for whom freedom to dissent, and to educate their 
children consistently with that dissent, resonates more deeply than the 
claims of equality. Justice Thomas, surely among that group, begins his 
Zelman concurrence by quoting Frederick Douglass: “[e]ducation . . . means 
emancipation. It means light and liberty. It means the uplifting of the soul 
of man into the glorious light of truth, the light by which men can only be 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. James, supra note 4, at 1128 n.203 (quoting Alfie Kohn, Only for My Kid: How Privileged 
Parents Undermine School Reform, PHI DELTA KAPPAN (Apr. 1998), http://www.alfiekohn.org/ 
teaching/ofmk.htm). 
 12. David B. Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case, 74 AM. HIST. 
REV. 74, 83–85 (1968). 
 13. Id. at 79–81. 
 14. Id. at 82 (quoting John Dewey, The School as a Means of Developing a Social Consciousness and 
Social Ideals in Children, 1 J. SOC. FORCES 513, 515 (1923)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 15. For examples of legal scholarship arguing for mandatory public education instead of 
additional choice, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 
52 AM. U. L. REV. 1461, 1472–73 (2003); James, supra note 4; James S. Liebman, Voice, Not 
Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 302, 307 (1991) (reviewing CHUBB & MOE, supra note 3). 
 16. See PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE 
DISTANCE 297–300 (2003). 
 17. Arons, supra note 8, at 89. 
 18. James, supra note 4, at 1085. 
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made free.”19 Whether the first goal of education is liberty or equality is 
genuinely a matter over which reasonable people of conviction disagree. 
This is a large part of the explanation for the consistent failure of the 
African American public and its institutions to generate consensus about 
school choice.20 
There is also the incontrovertible truth that, absent charters or 
vouchers, American educational localism itself establishes an insidious 
system of school choice. That the nation’s fifteen thousand local school 
districts each fund and manage monopoly public schools in their own 
geographical purviews invites Americans to choose their public schools by 
choosing where to live.21 This peculiar system of choice, propped up by 
racial segregation, economic stratification, and Milliken’s holding that 
segregation in one district is not susceptible to remedies that involve 
another, is particularly harmful to racial minorities and the economically 
disadvantaged. To choose an integrated school means that one must choose 
to live in an integrated jurisdiction or neighborhood. Similarly, to choose a 
good school means to pay for a house or an apartment, the price of which 
bundles all sorts of expensive public and private goods together.22 The rich 
can afford the bundle, while the educationally oriented poor are deprived of 
access to à la carte pricing.23 This is no kind of equality. 
Because Milliken is itself “a notable example of choice in education,”24 
because the system of post-Milliken, pre-voucher American schools “sanitizes 
unequal access to the societal good of education”25 at least as much as 
charters and vouchers do, then one must argue carefully about why market-
based choice is better or worse for equality than Milliken-based choice. One 
surely ought not compare the anti-egalitarian consequences of school choice 
as practiced—vouchers and charters with their real-life warts—to public-
sector monopoly schooling as it would exist in an ideal world, where schools 
are integrated “inclusive communit[ies]” that are of high quality and enjoy 
ample public support.26 The proper question is whether market-based 
 
 19. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 676 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(quoting FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Blessings of Liberty and Education: An Address Delivered in 
Manassas, Virginia, on 3 September 1894, in 5 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 616, 623 (John 
W. Blassingame & John R. McKivigan eds., 1992)). 
 20. See LISA M. STULBERG, RACE, SCHOOLS, AND HOPE: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND SCHOOL 
CHOICE AFTER BROWN 89–91 (2008); Kevin J. Dougherty & Lizabeth Sostre, Minerva and the 
Market: The Sources of the Movement for School Choice, in THE CHOICE CONTROVERSY 24, 31–33 
(Peter W. Cookson, Jr. ed., 1992). 
 21. Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support “Public” Schools, 48 B.C. L. REV. 
909, 911–12 (2007). 
 22. See SCHUCK, supra note 16, at 305. 
 23. Saiger, supra note 21, at 921. 
 24. James, supra note 4, at 1092. 
 25. Id. at 1088. 
 26. Id. at 1129. 
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choice reduces equality relative to our already racialized and unequal system 
based upon geographic choice. 
This leaves me rooting for those who, like Professor James, want to talk 
about choice explicitly in terms of tradeoffs between equality and liberty. 
The work of doing so, however, still lies before us. The task going forward is 
to delineate how a society that values both can reason together across deep 
and thoughtful disagreement about which should take precedence in the 
context of schooling. It is insufficient to say that choice is “inherently 
incompatible” with public education because “[p]ublic schools are about the 
public.”27 Schools can be public in the sense of being publicly regulated, 
publicly managed, publicly subsidized, or publicly provided; they can be 
public in the sense of being open to any child, free of charge for all, or 
compulsory across the board; they can be public because they are take-it-or-
leave-it common resources, like parks, or they can be public notwithstanding 
that they are commoditized and differentiated.28 That we have associated a 
particular kind of “publicness” with public schools for the past century or so, 
since the rise of the Progressive common-school movement, does not mean 
that other ways of being public are incoherent or out of bounds. What we 
have to discuss, across the range of what can fairly be called systems of public 
education, is the balance between equality and liberty that each offers us 
and how we should value those tradeoffs. 
II. WHAT IS “GENUINE CHOICE”? 
I have argued to this point that it is helpful to think about school choice 
in terms of liberty and equality and that it advances matters to think 
explicitly about tradeoffs between them. But one also encounters arguments 
that school choice, in many contexts, “can hardly be said to be genuine 
choice at all.”29 On this view, choice as practiced—voucher and charter 
programs as actually implemented—not only exacerbate inequality but also 
fail to enhance liberty. This is because the “choices” they offer to parents of 
little privilege are impoverished and illusory. 
It caricatures school choice advocacy to suggest that “genuine 
choice . . . can be integral to self-actualization, dignity, and equality”30 only if 
choices are diverse, rich, and multifarious. The ideas of a quasi-market and 
of consumer sovereignty do not depend for their force on the fantastic 
possibility that all options are equally available to everyone, or that people 
must choose free of constraint—even of “severely limit[ing]” constraint.31 
 
 27. Id. , at 1119. 
 28. See HENIG, supra note 3, at 51–52. 
 29. James, supra note 4, at 1119. 
 30. Id. at 1102; see also KENT GREENFIELD, THE MYTH OF CHOICE 119–22 (2011) (arguing 
that the benefits and prevalence of choice in economic markets are often misstated or simply 
incorrect). 
 31. James, supra note 4, at 1104. 
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Basic welfare economics rely upon the budget constraint: consumers working 
under those constraints realize consumer welfare nonetheless, because the 
market provides them with goods and services at prices below the value they 
assign to them.32 One can except Jean Valjean, “choosing” only pro forma 
between theft and starvation, and still recognize that many poor persons 
enjoy economic agency with respect to many transactions. 
Among such transactions are surely K–12 enrollment decisions under 
choice programs, which universally provide parents with public subsidies. 
There can be little doubt that more economic welfare can be had if 
consumers direct a subsidy than if the state does it for them. One might 
rather (all else equal) be a rich parent in Princeton, New Jersey, deciding 
between an excellent local public school or a competing charter that 
emphasizes traditional pedagogy,33 than an inner-city parent choosing 
between a distressed public school and a back-to-basics affinity charter.34 But 
this does not mean that parents with unsatisfying choices are not choosing. 
Nor is it res ipsa loquitur that some charter schools report poor 
academic achievement that is even worse than their competitor: traditional 
public schools.35 Choice does not guarantee good results. No serious person 
can claim that it does. But that choice is less than a panacea does not imply 
that the institutional form is a conspiracy of the powerful or that it exploits 
information asymmetries of marginalized minority parents.36 Contra Chubb 
and Moe, bad traditional public schools are not invariably bad because they 
are traditional public schools;37 too many good traditional public schools 
give lie to that assertion. For the same reason, low-quality charter and 
voucher schools do not imply that charters and vouchers are intrinsically of 
low quality. In particular, that several jurisdictions have yanked charters 
from schools that fail to post minimally adequate test scores does not 
demonstrate chartering’s failure.38 Quite the opposite: it shows a regulated 
market capable of self-correction. 
Moreover, choice advocates are right to reject the elitist argument that 
academic quality is the only measure of public schooling. Two schools that 
post similar levels of measured academic achievement are not necessarily 
similar across the board. Poor and rich parents alike might have very good 
reasons for thinking one better, even much better, than the other. Parents 
 
 32. Cf. GREENFIELD, supra note 30, at 122 (“The market also limits choices.”). 
 33. See CHIARA R. NAPPI, WHY CHARTER SCHOOLS?: THE PRINCETON STORY (1999), available 
at http://www.edexcellence.net/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs/wcs_8.pdf. 
 34. See James, supra note 4, at 1115. 
 35. Id. at 1085–86, 1097. 
 36. See id. at 1105. 
 37. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 3, at 26–27. 
 38. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, THE STATE OF CHARTER SCHOOL 
AUTHORIZING: 2010, at 45–47 & fig.2.9 (2011), available at http://www.qualitycharters.org/ 
assets/files/images/stories/publications/2010_facts_report.pdf. 
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reasonably choose schools along many dimensions orthogonal to math and 
reading scores: strength in the sciences, humanities, arts and music; 
particular pedagogical approaches; small classes or small schools; school 
cultures of discipline (for some) or nurturance (for others). One should 
have sympathy for parents in a dangerous neighborhood who trade some 
academic quality for safety, or for parents working double shifts who need 
their kids to walk alone to school and so trade quality for proximity to 
home,39 just as one can appreciate the motives of a rich parent who rejects a 
traditional math-and-English public school in favor of a competing, 
constructivist, arts-oriented charter that posts lower test scores. All these 
choices make sense to me; and what matters, of course, is that they make 
sense to the chooser. I cannot agree that even such choices are not made in 
“an education market, but rather a racialized social market.”40 School is about 
academics but also about arts, about safety, and about social communities.41 
The market reflects it all, and in that market parents choose, from the 
available menu, the packages that they want. 
One should not romanticize markets. They are imperfect. They 
sometimes fail. They rest upon preferences that many of us dislike. This is 
true of markets both competitive and monopolistic, heavily regulated and 
lightly regulated. Some schools of choice are incompetent and some are 
even corrupt,42 just like traditional public schools. But it is striking that 
Professor James repeatedly mentions food insecurity, inadequate housing, 
and the inaccessibility of healthcare as contributors to the educational 
distress of poor communities43 because this nation addresses all three in 
substantial part through subsidized vouchers redeemable in open, if 
regulated, marketplaces. In the case of food, where the externalities that one 
person’s consumption places upon others’ are minimal, the voucher 
approach is universal and nearly entirely uncontroversial. Notwithstanding 
minor regulation at the margin, everyone can see why it is better to let SNAP 
recipients exercise personal choices among groceries on store shelves than 
 
 39. See James, supra note 4, at 1105 n.91. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See MARK SCHNEIDER ET AL., CHOOSING SCHOOLS 87–95 & fig.4.1 (2000) (reviewing 
factors parents “find important” in schools); Eric A. Hanushek, Throwing Money at Schools, 1 J. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 19, 34 (1981) (asserting rationality of choosing schools for “pleasant 
surroundings, athletic facilities, [or] cultural advantages”); Bretten Kleitz et al., Choice, Charter 
Schools, and Household Preferences, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 846, 847 (2000) (reviewing prior literature 
raising “[s]erious questions . . . about the validity of” the claim “that all households seek the 
same thing from schools—quality education”); Kent L. Tedin & Gregory R. Weiher, 
Racial/Ethnic Diversity and Academic Quality as Components of School Choice, 66 J. POL. 1109,  
1111–12, 1130–32 (2004) (analyzing the relationship between preferences for school quality 
and diversity, and also noting preferences for “teaching moral values”). 
 42. James, supra note 4, at 1106 n.102. 
 43. Id. at 1089 n.15. 
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to issue each of them an identical food basket.44 With respect to housing, 
Section 8 vouchers have been deployed in no small part because choice can, 
in addition to SNAP-style direct welfare benefits associated with choice, 
ameliorate externalities related to the residential concentration of poverty.45 
With respect to healthcare, where externalities are perhaps even greater, the 
nation provides and subsidizes consumer choice among providers, both 
under multiple-payer schemes like that of the Affordable Care Act and 
under single-payer programs like Medicare. All charter and voucher 
programs, it is worth noting, are “single-payer.” 
These sectors do not perfectly parallel schooling. Nevertheless the 
partial analogies they offer are instructive. Each makes vivid the 
incontrovertible welfare benefits that private choice offers relative to public 
assignment. Housing and healthcare highlight, as well, the potential of 
consumer choice to mitigate as much as to exacerbate spillover effects. 
Surely these analogies suggest at least why it is not obvious that bad or 
inadequate choices should lead us to limit choices further. The alternative 
approach is to multiply options, expand their range and quality, and 
develop regulatory tools to address market failures. Policy levers that could 
accomplish this are available, and I have argued in favor of many of them. 
Raise voucher amounts.46 Increase per-student charter subsidies.47 Repeal 
caps on the number of charter schools in a jurisdiction.48 Develop rich, 
diverse, and culturally competent methods to communicate useful 
information about school options to parents. Vest chartering authority in 
institutions other than school districts.49 Expand the geographic scope of 
choice programs from cities to metropolitan areas.50 Force suburban 
 
 44. But see Tina Rosenberg, To Fight Obesity, a Carrot, and a Stick, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2013, 
2:35 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/to-fight-obesity-a-carrot-and-a-
stick (arguing in favor of limiting food stamps to healthier foods). Cf. JAMES C. OHLS & HAROLD 
BEEBOUT, THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM 12–18 (1993) (documenting the shift from a 
commodities distribution program to one of coupons that permit food aid recipients to select 
groceries in the general marketplace). 
 45. See Sara Aronchick Solow, Note, Racial Justice at Home: The Case for Opportunity-Housing 
Vouchers, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 503–04 & n.86 (2010) (noting Congress’s expectation 
that Section 8 vouchers would reduce the concentration of poverty, and suggesting reforms that 
would further that goal); see also Paulette J. Williams, The Continuing Crisis in Affordable Housing: 
Systemic Issues Requiring Systemic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 443 (2004) (reviewing 
HUD data on residential concentrations of poverty). 
 46. Saiger, supra note 21, at 957. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 959–60. 
 49. See Sebastian Mallaby, A Bridge for the Underclass, WASH. POST (June 13, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/12/AR2005061201418.html 
(“[G]iving school boards power over charter schools’ facilities is like entrusting decisions on Wal-Mart 
to Costco.”). 
 50. Saiger, supra note 21, at 958–59. 
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jurisdictions to admit non-resident students who choose their schools.51 
Minimize creaming by eliminating default placements, requiring all families 
actively to choose.52 Enlist religious educators in choice programs.53 
These are changes well within our grasp. Moreover, they should 
command support across existing cleavages, uniting those who favor more 
choice with those who favor choice only if it is “genuine.” 
III. THE POLITICS OF COMMODIFICATION AND CONVERGENCE 
A third argument against choice, developed by Opt-Out Education at 
length, is that market institutions catalyze politics that make it harder for 
this society to confront and address the root causes of its educational 
problems. 
Michael Sandel has recently argued that the commodification 
associated with choice generates a particular mindset: “Putting a price on 
the good things in life can corrupt them.”54 Commodifying schools in 
particular “erodes the sense of community obligation to others” and the 
centrality of collaboration in schooling, adds Professor James.55 Choice also 
obscures the ways that structural problems like poverty and inadequate, 
segregated housing worsen educational outcomes. 
Most critically, the mindset of marketized education foregrounds 
concepts of responsibility and of blame.56 By asking parents to choose, 
governments encourage them and everyone else to adopt the view that they 
are responsible for their choices. The concomitant conclusion is that bad 
outcomes are their own fault57—an effect multiplied manyfold when 
choosing parents are not white. In particular, Professor James elucidates the 
potential of choice to exacerbate the identification of educational 
deficiencies with supposed cultural deficiencies of students, their parents, 
and their communities. This is an observation both disturbing and 
important. 
At one level, this set of claims makes a descriptive claim about American 
politics. Markets offer no panacea. Even when functioning well and 
 
 51. Cf. Liebman, supra note 15, at 299–300. 
 52. This is the practice in New York City’s system of universal public high school choice. 
See High School Admissions: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), at 1–2, N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://schools.nyc.gov/ChoicesEnrollment/High/Resources/default.htm (follow “Frequently 
Asked Questions” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2, 2014); cf. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu et al., The New 
York City High School Match, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 364, 365–66 (2005). 
 53. See generally Aaron Saiger, Charter Schools, the Establishment Clause, and the Neoliberal Turn 
in Public Education, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1163 (2013). 
 54. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 9 (2012). 
 55. James, supra note 4, at 1106 (“[Commodification] alienates individuals from the 
community nature of public schooling.”). 
 56. Id. at 1086; accord Christopher Lubienski, Instrumentalist Perspectives on the “Public” in 
Public Education: Incentives and Purposes, 17 EDUC. POL’Y 478, 482, 497 (2003). 
 57. James, supra note 4, at 1086. 
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regulated optimally, they alone cannot cure educational distress in 
economically and racially segregated communities. Given that choice, even 
at its best, will leave much educational dysfunction in place and given that 
choices on offer are often deeply unsatisfactory, Professor James is right to 
critique the political ascendancy of choice, which she says catalyzes a politics 
of blaming parents and children for the problems that will inevitably persist. 
A program of education reform broader than choice, and one that locates 
responsibility in the state rather than in its less powerful members, is clearly 
necessary. 
But observations like these about the politics of choice also address 
questions of political strategy. Given its imperfections, should choice be 
rolled back, tolerated, or advanced? As I asked at the opening, is choice 
helpful? As to that question, James advocates rollback. One of her reasons is 
that the availability of choice makes it harder to develop political coalitions 
that fight educational inequity effectively.58 
This claim is in striking counterpoint to a different view of the political 
landscape, one that urges those who seek educational equity to capitalize 
upon, rather than shun, interest convergences between the educational 
preferences of relatively rich, relatively white suburbanites and poorer, less 
white families in urban and rural districts. Under this latter view, the lock 
that privileged suburban interests enjoy over education policy, centered as it 
is in state legislatures, state courts, and local districts, is something just short 
of an iron law; to promote equity or any other goal, one must work with it 
rather than merely bemoaning it. The argument for this claim, which cites 
the history of desegregation and re-segregation, Milliken, school finance 
litigation, and the accountability movement, has been developed at length, 
most prominently by James Ryan of the Harvard School of Education.59 In 
his view, choice is an instance of potential interest convergence that might 
allow real improvement in distressed public school systems in ways otherwise 
unavailable. 
If Professor James is right, however, to go down that road carries high 
costs. It makes it much harder to backtrack, not just because policy must be 
undone but because the political will to undo it will have been further 
attenuated and redirected. Even if one believes that choice is a second-best 
reform, one might abjure it for the roadblocks it places before the possibility 
of ever reaching the first-best. 
This is a genuine and important insight. It deserves to be highlighted 
and studied further. But to the extent that this objection to choice is about 
 
 58. Id. at 1086, 1127. 
 59. See JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART 5–17 (2010); James E. Ryan, 
Brown, School Choice, and the Suburban Veto, 90 VA. L. REV. 1635, 1645–47 (2004); James E. Ryan, 
Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 566–67 (1999); James E. 
Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2087–91 
(2002). 
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strategy, it needs to be analyzed in terms of realpolitik. One must assess the 
potential political effects of commodification and of cultural-deficiency 
thinking not only in terms of the political culture in general but of the 
political baseline that determines American educational policy. For myself, I 
am inclined to think that the baseline political potential of the kinds of 
coalitions in the interest of which Professor James abjures choice is low 
indeed. The utopian character of her vision is precisely what makes analysts 
like Ryan propose to work within, rather than in opposition to, suburban 
interests. (Indeed, a parallel utopianism with respect to educational equality 
among 1970s “civil rights lawyers” spurred Professor Derrick Bell to develop 
the theory of interest convergence in the first instance.60) As between 
regimes of school choice as a second-best, even ones that carry the political 
costs Professor James identifies, and hoping that distress within the 
traditional public system will somehow generate a radical new education 
politics, I opt for second best. Both history and politics make choice the 
better gamble. 
If we choose instead to reaffirm small-district localism, residence-based 
assignment, and top-down, state-based bureaucratic school management, 
educational policy will only continue to be shaped by decisions made in 
response to the continued racial and economic subordination—as well as 
the monopolist’s indifference to consumer preferences—that these 
institutions impose and reflect. Ultimately, what choice is that? 
 
 
 60. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523, 532 (1980). 
